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The Fast Track Debate: A
Prescription for Pragmatism
In June 1990, Presidents George Bush and Carlos Salinas de Gortari endorsed
the negotiation of a U.S.-Mexico free-trade agreement. In December 1990, trade
ministers from over 100 nations failed to reach agreement in the long-running
Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations. In February 1991, Presidents
Bush and Salinas and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announced their
intention to negotiate a trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
To continue the multilateral talks and to begin the NAFTA negotiations, Pres-
ident Bush on March 1, 1991, formally requested a two-year extension of "fast
track" procedures. This request unleashed a torrent of intense lobbying and
triggered a spirited debate in the Congress. Although much opposition to the
extension focused on certain industries that would likely be "losers" in free
trade with Mexico, the fast track procedure itself provoked concern and exten-
sive comment.
This article describes the fast track procedures and their previous applications.
It then summarizes the developments in the Uruguay Round multilateral trade
negotiations and with respect to Mexico (and Canada) that required extension of
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the fast track. Next, it outlines the concerns expressed by many in the Congress
and relates the President's response to those concerns. Finally, this article ana-
lyzes the debate in the Congress over the fast track extension and, in light of this
debate, offers a prescription for an effective executive-congressional partnership
in trade negotiations.
I. The Fast Track Procedures
Under the U.S. Constitution the President is empowered to conduct the foreign
affairs of the United States.' Therefore, the President does not need statutory
authority to negotiate with foreign countries, including trade negotiations. How-
ever, the Congress is empowered to make the laws in general2 and to regulate
trade with foreign nations in particular. 3 A trade agreement whose implementa-
tion requires changes in U.S. domestic law therefore falls squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Congress.
The fast track is a procedure devised in the Trade Act of 19744 to establish a
congressional-executive partnership for trade negotiations. It enhances the Pres-
ident's credibility in trade negotiations, in particular by increasing the likelihood
that Congress will implement the trade agreements that he negotiates with advice
from and in consultation with the Congress. Fast track authority expired in
January 1988, but was revived in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 (1988 Act). 5 Sections 1102 and 1103 of the 1988 Act 6 provide the
authority and set forth the conditions for the application of the fast track proce-
dures provided in section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974. 7
Basically, those procedures have been applied to any legislation implementing
a trade agreement entered into under section 1102(b) or (c) of the 1988 Act8
before June 1, 1991, provided:
0 in the case of bilateral agreements, the foreign country requested the nego-
tiation and the President provided at least sixty days' notice to the Senate
1. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
3. Id. cl. 3.
4. Trade Actof 1974, §§ 101-102, 151, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 1982, 2001 (1975)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2111-2112, 2191) (1988) [hereinafter 1974 Act]. For an excellent
overview of the fast track, see Harold H. Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade
Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191 (1986); Koh, History of
the Fast-Track Approval Mechanism, in JUDITH H. BELLO & ALAN F. HOLMER, GUIDE TO THE
U.S.-CANADA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT 1 (1990).
5. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1990)) [hereinafter 1988 Act].
6. Id. §§ 1102-1103, 19 U.S.C. § 2902-2903.
7. 1974 Act § 151, 19 U.S.C. § 2191.
8. Section 1102(b) concerns agreements (other than bilateral agreements) regarding nontariff
barriers. Section 1102(c) deals with bilateral agreements regarding tariff and nontariff barriers. Id.
§ 1102(b)-(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2902(b)-(c). Section 1102(a) gives the President authority to proclaim
reductions in U.S. tariffs, subject to specified limits. Id. § 1102(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2902(a).
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Finance and House Ways and Means Committees of his intention to enter
into negotiations;
9
* the President notified the House of Representatives and Senate of his in-
tention to enter into the agreement at least ninety calendar days before the
day on which he entered into the agreement;
10
" after entering into the agreement, the President submitted to the House and
Senate the agreement, a draft implementing bill, a statement of adminis-
trative action proposed to implement the agreement, and detailed supporting
information," 1 including notably a statement explaining how the agreement
makes progress in achieving the negotiating objectives established in sec-
tion 1101;12 and
" both the House and the Senate did not separately agree to procedural dis-
approval resolutions within any sixty-day period, making legislation to
implement a trade agreement ineligible for fast track procedures on the basis
of the President's failure or refusal to consult with Congress on trade ne-
gotiations. 13
The 1988 Act further provided an opportunity to extend the above-described
deadlines to cover any trade agreement entered into after May 31, 1991, and
before June 1, 1993, if and only if:
" the President requested such extension by March 1, 1991;
* the President submitted to Congress a report: (1) describing all the trade
agreements that have been negotiated under section 1102(b) or (c) and when
they will be submitted to Congress for approval, 14 (2) describing the
progress made to date in the remaining negotiations, (3) stating that such
progress justifies continuation of the negotiations, and (4) stating the rea-
sons why the extension is needed to complete the negotiations;
" by March 1, 1991, the private sector Advisory Committee for Trade Policy
and Negotiations submitted a report to Congress on its views regarding the
9. Id. § l 102(c)(3)(B)-(C), 19 U.S.C. § 2902(c)(3)(B)-(C).
10. Id. § 1103(a)(1)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1)(A).
11. Id. § 1103(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2). The required information includes: (1) an expla-
nation how the implementing bill and proposed administrative action will affect existing law; (2) a
statement that the agreement makes progress in achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and
objectives set forth in § 1101 of the 1988 Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2901; (3) a statement of the President's
reasons regarding how the agreement makes such progress (as well as the extent to which the
agreement does not do so), how it serves the interests of U.S. commerce, and why the implementing
bill and proposed administrative action are required or appropriate to carry out the agreement; (4) a
statement describing the efforts of the President to obtain international exchange rate equilibrium and
any effect of the agreement on increased international monetary stability; and (5) a statement relating
to noncommercial state trading enterprises.
12. Id. § 1101, 19 U.S.C. § 2901.
13. id. § 1103(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2903(c).
14. Presumably, the President would indicate that he planned to submit all Uruguay Round
agreements as a package, even if some were already concluded. In fact, it seems unlikely that any
agreements will be firmly concluded until they all are.
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progress made in the negotiations and the reasons for its views regarding
whether the requested extension should be approved or disapproved; and
9 neither the House nor the Senate adopted an extension disapproval resolu-
tion before June 1, 1991.1
5
An extension disapproval resolution could be introduced by any member of Con-
gress. ' 6 Any such resolution would be referred to the Committee on Finance in the
Senate or, in the House, to the Committees on Ways and Means and Rules. Impor-
tantly, there is no automatic discharge provision' 7-meaning that a resolution re-
ferred to such committees could simply languish there without further action.
II. The Previous Applications of Fast Track Procedures
As noted above, the United States Congress established the fast track in the
Trade Act of 1974,18 the central purpose of which was to facilitate the seventh
or Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).1 9 With advice from the Con-
gress and the private sector, those negotiations were finally concluded in April
1979 when the United States and other GATT trading partners signed various
codes and framework agreements amending the GATT for their signatories.20 In
accordance with the fast track procedures, implementing legislation was coop-
eratively drafted by the executive branch (led by the Office of the then Special
Trade Representative) and the Congress (led by the Senate Finance and House
Ways and Means Committees). The President then submitted the bill already
agreed upon, which was passed by the House (395-7)2 and Senate (90-4)22 and
enacted into law as the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.23
15. 1988 Act § 1103(b)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b)(1)(B). Moreover, any extension disapproval
resolution introduced in either house must be reported out of the committee to which it is referred (in
the House, the Rules and the Ways and Means Committees; in the Senate, the Committee on Finance)
by no later than May 15, 1991.
16. Id. § 1103(b)(5)(B)(i), 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b)(5)(B)(i).
17. Section 1103(5)(C) of the 1988 Act (19 U.S.C. § 2903(5)(C)) makes only § 152(d)-(e)
(19 U.S.C. § 2192(d)-(e)) relating to floor consideration, applicable to extension disapproval reso-
lutions, and does not make applicable § 152(c) (19 U.S.C. § 2192(c)) on discharge of a resolution
from a committee.
18. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. (pts. 5 & 6) A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
20. E.g., Agreement on Interpretation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650; International Dairy Agreement, Apr. 12,
1979, 31 U.S.T. 679, T.I.A.S. No. 9623; Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979, 31
U.S.T. 619, T.I.A.S. No. 9620; Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI
and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S.
No. 9619; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S.
No. 9616.
21. 125 CONG. REC. 18017 (1979).
22. Id. at 20194.
23. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5, 19, 26 and 31 U.S.C. (1988)).
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The next two uses of the fast track were to implement bilateral rather than
multilateral agreements. First, the Trade and Tariff Act of 198424 outlined ob-
jectives for, and authorized the negotiation of, a free trade agreement with
Israel.25 With advice from the Congress and the private sector, the administration
concluded those negotiations the following year and then cooperatively drafted
an implementing bill with the Congress. The House passed the bill submitted by
the President following this joint collaboration by a vote of 422-0,26 and the
Senate passed the bill by a voice vote. 27 The bill was then enacted as the United
States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985.28
Second, in response to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's request in 1985,29
and with the advice of the Congress and the private sector, the United States and
Canada negotiated a free trade agreement signed by the President and the Prime
Minister on January 2, 1988.30 While the administration felt it had consulted the
Congress regularly and in detail,31 some in the Congress strongly disagreed.32
Nonetheless, the congressional leadership entered into an agreement with Sec-
retary of the Treasury James A. Baker III and U.S. Trade Representative Clayton
Yeutter concerning the legislation to implement the Canada agreement.
The administration officials agreed to draft the bill cooperatively with the
Congress. Moreover, they agreed to accept the provisions worked out in this
consultative process, provided: (1) they were consistent with the agreement and
its implementation, and (2) were appropriate to carrying out its fundamental
purposes. For their part, the congressional officials agreed to vote on the legis-
lation submitted by the President in 1988, and to use their best efforts to expedite
the process and vote before the August recess, if possible. 33 Under these pro-
24. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 18, 19, 22, 26, 28, 29, 31, 49 and 50 U.S.C. (1988)).
25. Id., tit. IV (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1988)).
26. 13.1 CONG. REc. 10631 (1985).
27. Id. at 13574.
28. United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-47, 99
Stat. 82 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note (1988)).
29. Letter from Prime Minister Mulroney to President Reagan (Oct. 1, 1985), reprinted in
BELLO & HOLMER, supra note 4, app. at A-1.
30. See generally id.
31. See, e.g., the list of consultations between congressional committees and the executive
branch prepared by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in 1987, reprinted in id. app. at A-6.
32. For example, Senator Max S. Baucus (D-Mont.) wrote that "[tihe Reagan Administration's
consultations with Congress concerning the FTA were reminiscent of the academic strategy of the
average college student. During the term, important assignments were ignored or halfheartedly
carried out. But, with failure close at hand, they were able to study all night to pass the final." Id.
at 88. Several years later, some members would still recall what, in their view, had been inadequate
consultations regarding the FTA. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H3500 (daily ed. May 23, 1991)
(statements by Rep. Donald J. Pease (D-Ohio) during the fast track extension debate); id. at H3608
(debate statements by Rep. Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo.)); id. at S6552 (debate statements by Sen.
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.)).
33. Exchange of letters between Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker III and Ambassador
Clayton Yeutter and the Hons. Jim Wright, Robert Byrd, Dan Rostenkowski, and Lloyd Bentsen
(Feb. 17, 1988), reprinted in BELLO & HOLMER, supra note 4, app. at A-10, 11.
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cedures, the administration and Congress again cooperatively drafted legislation
that the President then submitted to the Congress. As passed by the House
(366-40) 34 and Senate (83-9), 3 5 that bill was enacted as the United States-Canada
Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988.36
III. Developments in the Uruguay Round and with
Mexico Requiring Extension of the Fast Track
In 1982 the United States sought to capitalize on the Tokyo Round momentum
and generate support for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. At the
GATT ministerial meeting the United States tried, but failed in this effort. The
resulting disappointment helped fuel U.S. resort to bilateral and plurilateral
initiatives, notably the free trade negotiations with Israel (1984-85) and Canada
(1985-87). Nonetheless, the U.S. remained committed to the GATT and its
further liberalization. Finally in 1986, at another more successful ministerial
meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, an eighth round of multilateral trade nego-
tiations was finally launched, scheduled to be concluded within four years.
3 7
A midterm review in Montreal in December 1988 involved trade ministers in
their staffs' negotiations, crystallized issues, and mapped out a timetable and
direction for final negotiations.38 In the spring of 1990, U.S. trade negotiators
planned their final assault aimed at a successful conclusion in December 1990.
They planned to use interim events-a trade summit at Puerto Vallarta, Mexico,
in April, the G-7 Economic Summit in Houston in early July, and a meeting of
the GATT Trade Negotiations Committee in late July-to create enough crises to
compel reluctant trading partners to make the painful concessions needed to
conclude the Round successfully.
However, the Mexican meeting did not jump-start serious negotiations; in
Houston the European Communities appeared to agree, but later did not agree,
to meaningful agricultural reform; and the Trade Negotiations Committee meet-
ing did not resolve impasses or generate momentum. At the Brussels meeting in
December 1990, the talks broke down, principally over the continued impasse
regarding, in particular, the use of subsidies. The meeting was adjourned sine
die, without a certainty of resumption.
Meanwhile, the United States did not put all its trade-liberalizing eggs in one
basket. While the GATT remains the cornerstone of U.S. trade policy, Presidents
Bush and Salinas announced their intention to pursue a free trade agreement on
34. 134 CONG. REC. 21295 (1988).
35. Id. at 24444.
36. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note (1990)).
37. GAIT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (Sept. 20, 1986).
38. GAT Secretariat, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Trade Negotiations Committee, Trade
Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level (Dec. 9, 1988) (restricted document).
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June 10, 1991.39 At their direction, trade ministers Carla A. Hills and Jaime
Serra Puche consulted, and in August 1990 recommended the launch of nego-
tiations. 4° On September 25, 1990, President Bush formally notified the Con-
gress of his intention to negotiate a free trade agreement with Mexico. In Feb-
ruary 1991 the U.S. and Mexican presidents and Canadian Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney announced that Canada would participate too, making it a trilateral
North American Free Trade Agreement negotiation.41 On February 5, 1991,
President Bush formally notified the Congress of his intention of negotiating a
free trade agreement with Canada as well as Mexico.42
Also in February 1991 all Uruguay Round participants (including the Euro-
pean Communities) agreed to negotiate agricultural subsidy reductions in each of
the three major areas.43 Negotiations in Geneva could then resume. However,
under the U.S. fast track, time had run out.
IV. The President's Extension Request and
Response to Congressional Concerns
The fast track was due to expire on March 1, 1991, the deadline for the
President to notify the Congress of his intention to enter into any trade agree-
ment. The President had high hopes for both a NAFTA and a successful con-
clusion to the Round, but nothing in hand. To preserve the fast track option for
these negotiations (as well as any possible agreement resulting from the Enter-
prise for the Americas Initiative), the President requested an extension of the fast
track on March 1, 1991.44 He submitted to the Congress all necessary supporting
documents, including a voluminous report on progress in the Uruguay Round
multilateral trade negotiations 45 and a report of the Advisory Committee on
39. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by the Presidents of Mexico
and the United States on Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement (June 11, 1990).
40. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, JOINT REPORT BY THE U.S. TRADE REPRESEN-
TATIVE AND THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICO TO THE PRES-
IDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES ON
BILATERAL U.S.-MExIcAN TRADE (Aug. 8, 1990).
41. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Text of a Letter from the President to the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance and the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways
and Means (Sept. 25, 1990).
42. Letter from President Bush to Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, Committee on Ways and
Means (Feb. 5, 1991).
43. Specifically, participants agreed "to conduct [agricultural] negotiations to achieve specific
binding commitments on each of the following areas: domestic support, market access, and export
competition ...." Proposal by the Chairman at Official Level, Trade Negotiations Committee,
Programme of Work (Feb. 26, 1991).
44. Letter from President Bush to the Congress (March 1, 1991) (available from the White
House, Office of the Press Secretary).
45. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE EXTENSION OF FAST TRACK PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO
SECTION 1103(B) OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988, H.R. Doc. No. 51,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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Trade Policy and Negotiations endorsing the extension of fast track, continuation
of the Round, and the NAFTA initiative.46
If the President's request had concerned use of the fast track solely to imple-
ment any Uruguay Round agreements, the reaction in the Congress might have
been muted. His proposal of a free trade agreement with Mexico, however,
provoked strong concerns in the Congress and among some interest groups in the
private sector. In particular, organized labor strongly opposed the fast track
extension for fear of losing American jobs to Mexico because of lower labor rates
and less stringent (and less stringently enforced) Mexican standards. Many en-
vironmental groups echoed strong concerns as well, fearing protection of the
environment would be eroded.
Crystallizing such concerns, Senate Finance and House Ways and Means
Committee Chairmen Lloyd Bentsen and Dan Rostenkowski wrote President
Bush on March 7.47 The chairmen's letter asked the President to indicate, by no
later than May 1, his plans with respect to labor and environmental issues in
connection with the Mexican negotiations. On March 27, House Majority
Leader Richard A. Gephardt also wrote the President, asking for the adminis-
tration's plans regarding wage disparity, rules of origin, environmental protec-
tion, health and safety standards, labor mobility, worker and human rights, an
escape clause, and worker adjustment programs.4a
The administration responded to the committee chairmen and majority leader
on May 1. In his letter the President first made a personal commitment to "close
bipartisan cooperation in the negotiations and beyond." 49 Second, he agreed to
work with the Congress to provide adequate worker adjustment assistance.
Third, he agreed to develop and implement an expanded program of U.S.-
Mexico environmental cooperation parallel to the NAFTA talks. Fourth, he also
agreed to work through new initiatives with Mexico to expand bilateral labor
cooperation.50
Submitted in support of the President's letter, numerous memoranda:
0 described Mexico's record on labor and environmental issues, to correct any
misunderstandings about Mexico's commitments to worker rights and ad-
equate protection of the environment;
46. ADVISORY COMM. FOR TRADE POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS, REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS
CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR THE EXTENSION OF FAST TRACK PROCEDURES IMPLEMENT-
ING LEGISLATION FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS (March 1991).
47. Letter to the President from Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman, Committee on Finance, and
Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means (March 7, 1991),
reprinted in COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON ISSUES CONCERNING THE
NEGOTIATION OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 87
(Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter EXCHANGE OF LETTERS].
48. Id. at 89-98.
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id.
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* described various economic studies demonstrating that a free-trade agree-
ment with Mexico would provide economic benefits to the United States;
* outlined the administration's plan to conduct separate, but parallel negoti-
ations with Mexico on environmental issues; and
* indicated how the United States and Mexico proposed to consult on labor-
related issues.51
In addition to this eighty-six-page response, administration witnesses testified
before numerous committees in support of the President's request for extension
of the fast track. They argued that:
* An extension was essential to continued U.S. economic leadership.
* Without fast track authority, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) would be out of business; USTR could not engage in trade liber-
alizing negotiations without the fast track. Congress had to decide whether
or not it wanted USTR to negotiate trade liberalizing agreements. If it did,
it was essential it give USTR the fast track.
* The vote on the fast track extension was not a vote on any result and did not
lock any member in; it was only a procedural vote.
* The fast track was neither a fast, nor a narrow, track; the administration was
not trying to rush anything through. Congress had ample time for input in
the negotiations and review of the final agreement.
9 The administration would honor its end of the bargain: Congress would
receive detailed consultations, and the administration would write the im-
plementing legislation with Congress. Members could vote against the im-
plementing legislation the President submitted if they believed the agree-
ment he negotiated was unacceptable.52
Meanwhile, fast track extension disapproval resolutions were introduced and
reported out of committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
The House resolution, H. Res. 101, was sponsored by Representative Byron L.
Dorgan (D-S.D.); the identical Senate measure, S. Res. 78, was sponsored by
Senator Ernest L. Hollings (D-S.C.). The Dorgan resolution was reported out of
the Ways and Means Committee unfavorably on a vote of 27-9 on May 14.
53
The Hollings resolution likewise was reported unfavorably out of the Finance
Committee on a vote of 15-3 on May 14. 5 4 With the receipt of the administra-
51. Id. at 4-86.
52. See, e.g., statements of Ambassador Carla A. Hills before the Senate Comm. on Finance
(Feb. 6, 1991); Subcomm. on Trade, House Comm. on Ways and Means (Feb. 20, 1991); House
Comm. on Ways and Means (March 12, 1991); House Comm. on Agriculture (April 24, 1991).
53. H.R. REP. No. 63, pt. 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 9 (1991).
54. S. REP. No. 56, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1991). Both Chairmen Rostenkowski and Bentsen
elected to report the resolutions out for floor action, rather than keep them bottled up in committee,
even though the fast track procedures do not provide for the automatic discharge of a resolution from
committee. See supra notes 4, 18 and accompanying text; see also 137 CONG. REC. S6550-54 (daily
ed. May 23, 1991) (comments of Chairman Bentsen).
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tion's response, a torrent of lobbying by various interest groups, 55 and the
reports of the Finance and Ways and Means Committees, the congressional
debate began.
V. The Congressional Debate over Extension of the Fast Track
Much of the debate in the Congress over the President's fast track extension
request centered on the substance of the negotiations concerned, in particular the
NAFTA talks with Mexico. 56 However, a considerable portion of the debate
addressed the fast track procedure itself. A few members suggested that the fast
track procedure was unconstitutional. 57 Most opponents of its extension, how-





"surrender,'"' 6 or "relinquish[ment] ' 6t of congressional power, prerogatives,
and responsibilities. They opposed giving the executive a "carte blanche,"
"blank check," 62 or "keys to the store,' 63 thus reducing the role of Congress to
that of a mere "rubber stamp.
' 64
Some opponents argued that fast track required that Congress trust the
administration-a trust that some felt unwarranted by the administration's track
record.65 Indeed, such distrust was not limited to the Bush administration, or
even to Republican administrations, by a Democratic Congress. The distrust
55. See, e.g., Jill Abramson, U.S.-Mexico Trade Pact Is Pitting Vast Armies of Capitol Lobbyists
against Each Other, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1991, at A16; see also 137 CONG. REc. S6634-36 (daily
ed. May 23, 1991), S6797-98, S6810-11, S6816-17 (daily ed. May 24, 1991) (letters and press
releases incorporated in the fast track extension congressional debate).
56. See, e.g., id. at S6614-15 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (comments of Sen. Slade Gorton
(R-Wash.)).
57. See, e.g., id. at H3505 (comments of Rep. John J. LaFalce (D-N.Y.)) ("The whole concept
of fast-track authority is ultra vires and unenforceable."); id. at H3565 (comments of Rep. Gerald D.
Kleczka (D-Wis.)) ("Our founding fathers would shudder at the thought of an agreement with so great
an impact on American lives not subject to the consideration of elected representatives.").
58. Id. at H3503 (comments of Rep. LaFalce).
59. Id. at H3514 (comments of Rep. Cardiss Collins (D-Ill.)), H3529 (comments of Rep.
David R. Obey (D-Wis.)), H3544 (comments of Rep. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.)), S6574 (comments
of Sen. Jesse A. Helms (R-N.C.)).
60. Id. at H3524 (comments of Rep. Tim Johnson (D-S.D.)), H3574 (comments of Rep. Louis
Stokes (D-Ohio)).
61. Id. at H3531 (comments of Rep. Ed Jenkins (D-Ga.)).
62. Id. at H3578 (comments of Rep. Craig Thomas (R-Wyo.)), H3590 (comments of Rep.
Thomas McMillen (D-Md.)). Both of those representatives supported fast track extension and argued
that such extension was not a blank check. Contra id. at H3582 (comments of Delegate Eleanor
Holmes Norton (D-D.C.)), H3587 (comments of Rep. Nick J. Rahall, II (D-W.Va.)).
63. Id. at H3584 (comments of fast track supporter Rep. Robert F. Smith (R-Or.)).
64. Id. at H3579 (comments of Rep. Ted Weiss (D-N.Y.)); see also id. at S6595 (comments of
Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)).
65. See id. at H3519 (comments of Rep. Dorgan) ("Do I trust this administration? Of course
not."); see also id. at H3547 (comments of Rep. Andrews), H3549 (comments of Rep. Kildee),
H3551 (comments of Rep. Conyers), H3562 (comments of Rep. Wolpe). Representative Douglas
Applegate (D-Ohio) also claimed that "[t]he Administration's track record on trade stinks." Id. at
H3605.
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expressed was institutional-of the executive branch by the Congress. For ex-
ample, one congressman said: "Trade negotiators ask you to just trust them. The
Tokyo Round experience [led by the Democratic Carter administration] shows
they were willing to lie massively to get a deal. And they want us to respect them
in the morning and trust them again.'' 66 In addition to the Tokyo Round, the use
of fast track with respect to the more recent free-trade agreement with Canada
was criticized. Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.) spoke of what he charac-
terized as the administration's broken promises regarding the FTA;67 Majority
Leader Richard Gephardt said that the public debate of that agreement prior to its
conclusion was "almost nonexistent."
68
In particular, some members-including some fast track supporters-
complained of the inadequacy of past administrations' consultations with the
Congress. Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen, for example, said that
the Reagan administration's initial consultations with the Congress regarding the
U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement were inadequate. 69 While he maintained
that the Bush administration had "learned that lesson" and "[has] been con-
sulting with us every step of the way,' 70 other members disagreed. Senator
Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.), for example, maintained: "In my experience, the
consultations have not been meaningful .... Muggers meet directly with their
victims, too, but we don't call it consultations." 71 Senator Ernest B. Hollings
(D-S. C.) echoed this concern: "[T]hey claim that the distinguished Ambassador
for Trade, Carla Hills, she consults. She consults. That is what I am complaining
about. These consultations are killing us."
7 2
Some members disagreed that the fast track was necessary to conduct any
trade negotiations. Congressmen Jenkins and Helms, for example, both said they
just did not accept the argument that fast track authority "is essential to a
successful negotiation of new trade agreements. ' 73 As Representative
William L. Clay (D-Mo.) argued: "Fast track may be convenient to the President
of the United States, but it is by no means essential to his ability to negotiate
international agreements.
' 74
On the other hand, many who supported the extension of fast track for the
multilateral Uruguay Round negotiations opposed, or expressed serious reserva-
66. Id. at H3516 (comments of Rep. Stark).
67. Id. at H3547-48 passim.
68. Id. at H3608.
69. Id. at S6552 (daily ed. May 24, 1991). He then added that the administration later "got the
message and then they came and consulted." Id.; see also supra note 32 for similar comments of Sen.
Baucus concerning consultations concerning the U.S.-Canada FTA.
70. 137 CONG. REc. S6552 (daily ed. May 24, 1991).
71. Id. at S6640.
72. Id. at S6778.
73. Id. at S6575 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (comments of Sen. Helms); see also id. at H3530-31
(comments of Rep. Jenkins).
74. Id. at H3585.
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tions about, its use for the NAFTA talks. Representative Pease, for example,
maintained that the use of the fast track "is warranted when negotiating trade
agreements with as many as 107 partners." 75 The administration, however, did
not persuade Representative Pease and others that fast track was necessary in
negotiations with far-fewer trading partners. As Senator Paul S. Sarbanes
(D-Md.) argued:
I have voted for this [fast track] procedure on GATT in the past. I was moved by the
argument that if you go to a negotiation with 107 negotiators, it is very difficult to go
back and renegotiate it .... But now, the administration is extending this to negotia-
tions with individual countries.
I do not support the administration's path of moving to make fast track
standard operating procedure in each trade negotiation that comes along.76
In addition to this concern about the use of fast track for bilateral or trilateral
negotiations generally, opposition was expressed to its use for talks with Mexico
in particular. Senator Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) argued: "The Mexicans initiated
these trade talks. The Mexicans want this agreement. And the Mexicans will
continue to negotiate with or without the fast track. That is the reality.' 77 Further,
some members noted reports of a statement by the Mexican chief negotiator that
Mexico would negotiate with the United States, with or without the fast track.7 s
In response to these concerns, fast track supporters made the following argu-
ments. First, they maintained that trade negotiations are an essential component
of any strategy to enhance American competitiveness. House Majority Leader
Gephardt began the argument: "[I]f we [can] open closed markets today we can
open closed factories tomorrow." 79 Senator Lloyd Bentsen and Chairman of the
Finance Subcommittee on International Trade, Max Baucus, continued it:
If you are serious about cracking down on foreign barriers, trade negotiations must
be a part of your strategy. In the absence of negotiations, a multitude of unfair foreign
barriers will remain. And the United States cannot settle for that-not if we want to be
effective competitors for world markets.80
75. Id. at H3500.
76. Id. at S6598-99; see also id. at S6787 (daily ed. May 24, 1991) (comments of Sen. Ed-
ward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.)) ("[I]t is difficult to envision a multilateral trade negotiation that would
allow each nation to amend the treaty. And that is why the fast track procedure should be approved.
But I want to express my deep concern over the Administration's use of fast track authority to enter
into trade negotiations with Mexico."); id. at S6825 (comments of Sen. Joseph R. Biden (D-Del.))
("[F]ast track was designed with multilateral negotiations in mind.").
77. Id. at S6603 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
78. See, e.g., id. at S6598 (comments of Sen. Sarbanes), S6602 (comments of Sen. Metzen-
baum). Metzenbaum referenced excerpts from El Financiero, "a respected Mexican newspaper,"
which reported the following observation made by Mexican Chief Negotiator Herminio Blanco in
March 1991: " 'With the fast track or without it, in any case the negotiations will be carried out.'
Id. at S6602-03.
79. Id. at H3607.
80. Id. at S6552 (comments of Sen. Bentsen).
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Instead of bemoaning the problems, we should be looking for solutions. And one of
the best available solutions is to open foreign markets with trade agreements."'
Second, fast track supporters argued that other nations simply would not
participate in trade negotiations with the United States except under fast track
procedures. As Senator John C. Danforth (R-Mo.) summarized:
[I]t is the overwhelming opinion of people who know anything about international trade
that without fast track there is no possibility of a trade agreement. It is just not going
to happen .... Carla Hills says she has been told by her negotiating partners, forget
it, we are not even going to talk to you.
8 2
Sam M. Gibbons (D-Fla.), chairman of the Subcommittee on International
Trade, House Committee on Ways and Means, explained that during the sixth
round of multilateral trade negotiations, the Kennedy Round, the administration
had negotiated two agreements that the Congress subsequently had refused to
implement legislatively. This experience, he noted, was the reason Congress
created the fast track. Failure to implement the Kennedy Round agreements
convinced the trading partners of the United States that negotiations with the
U.S. executive branch lacked an adequate foundation in the absence of some
substantial indication that the Congress supported the executive in the negotia-
tions.8 3 As Chairman Gibbons summarized, the reaction of trading partners was:
" 'Listen, unless you reform your congressional procedures, we aren't dealing
with you anymore. You are not a reliable bargainer.' "84
Thus, argued fast track supporters, trade negotiations were essential to stim-
ulate American competitiveness, and the fast track was essential to trade nego-
tiations. Moreover, they added, the fast track did not reduce, but rather en-
hanced, the role of the Congress in trade negotiations. The fast track ensured that
the Congress was a partner in the executive's deliberations with foreign nations
on trade matters. "Fast track enables us to be a trade negotiating partner with the
ultimate power to say yes or no," said House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel
(R-Ill.). 8 5 Indeed, Chairman Dan Rostenkowski of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee argued that as a result of the fast track extension debate, Congress "has
already strongly influenced the scope, agenda and course of the North American
free trade negotiations before they even begin.
' 86
81. Id. at S6798 (daily ed. May 24, 1991) (comments of Sen. Baucus).
82. Id. at S6623 (daily ed. May 23, 1991); see also id. at H3498-99 (comments of Rep. David
Dreier (R-Cal.)), H3503 (comments of Sam M. Gibbons (D-Fla.)).
83. Id. at H3503, H3517.
84. Id. at H3503.
85. Id. at H3559; see also, e.g., id. at H3518 (comments of Rep. Bill Archer (R-Tex.)), H3546
(comments of Rep. David E. Price (D-N.C.)), H3607 (comments of Rep. Rostenkowski (D-Il.)).
86. Id. at H3521; see also id. at S6596 (comments of Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.))
("Congress's role is not cosmetic"); id. at S6806 (daily ed. May 24, 1991) (comments of Sen.
Connie Mack (R-Fla.)) (asserting that the fast track does not eliminate the Congress's influence on
the outcome of trade negotiations).
SPRING 1992
196 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Moreover, supporters generally credited at least the current administration
with doing a good job in consulting with the Congress on trade negotiations.
As ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee Bob Packwood (R-Or.)
concluded: "If there is anything that can be said now about our U.S. Trade
Representative, Ambassador Carla Hills, it is that she has given us opportu-
nity after opportunity ... for input." 87 Further, many supporters stressed that
Bush administration trade negotiators had earned the Congress's trust by
allowing the Brussels Ministerial to fail rather than to accept bad agreements.
Speaker after speaker in the fast track extension debate gave the administration
substantial credit for the courage of its conviction that no agreement was
better than a bad agreement. For example, Representative Philip M. Crane
(R-Ill.) "remind[ed] . . . those of little faith, that it was our distinguished
U.S. Trade Representative who refused to conclude what in her eyes was an
unsatisfactory agreement in the Uruguay round." 8 8 Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.)
added:
The fact that Carla Hills was willing to walk away from the last best offer of the
Europeans at the end of the GATT round in late 1990s tells me that this is a lady of real
toughness. And it convinces me that she will be prepared to walk away from another
GATIr round if the final offer is not acceptable and will be willing to walk away from
a United States-Mexico agreement if not successful.8 9
Next, fast track supporters maintained that extension of fast track procedures
did not require a wholesale delegation of trust to the administration. As several
members indicated, "Trust but verify" may be applied to trade as well as
strategic arms negotiations. 9° Indeed, many fast track supporters who voted
against the extension disapproval resolutions joined fast track opponents in
stressing their intention to seek to maximize congressional influence in the ne-
gotiations and scrutinize the outcome closely:
" Congressman David E. Skaggs (D-Colo.): "Negotiate, Mr. President, but
negotiate well. . . . I'll be reading the fine print of any agreement." 9'
" Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.): "I will be looking carefully at the final
agreement reached in the Uruguay round and the trade agreement with
Mexico, and my vote for the fast track in no way commits me to vote for
final approval.' 
92
87. Id. at S6555 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
88. Id. at H3527.
89. Id. at S6607; see also, e.g., id. at H3595 (comments of Rep. Bill Emerson (R-Mo.)), S6600
(comments of Sen. Dave Durenburger (R-Minn.)), S6617 (comments of Sen. Dennis DeConcini
(D-Ariz.)), S6798 (comments of Sen. Max Baucus). But cf., e.g., id. at S6595 (comments of Sen.
Tom Harkin (D-lowa)), 56640 (comments of Sen. Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.)).
90. Id. at H3572 (comments of Rep. William Hughes (D-N.J.)).
91. Id. at H3592-93. He also added: "We promise you careful scrutiny of the results." Id. at
H3594.
92. Id. at S6814 (daily ed. May 24, 1991).
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e Congressman Doug Bereuter (R-Neb.): "This Member would... serve
notice to the administration that he will go over the eventual NAFTA with
a fine-toothed comb. ' 9
3
Perhaps the House Majority Leader characterized this attitude most colorfully:
I am serving notice today that Congress will [keep the pressure on] Chairman Rosten-
kowski, Senator Bentsen, and I will sound like the song by the [P]olice that goes,
"Every breath you take, every step you take, every move you make, we'll be watching
you." Trust but verify: that will be our policy.9'
Finally, various members-fast track supporters and opponents-indicated that
if the Congress was dissatisfied with the agreements the administration negoti-
ated, then it had, and might exercise, the right to change the fast track rules.95
Ultimately the fast track supporters prevailed. On May 23, 1991, the House of
Representatives rejected the fast track disapproval resolution sponsored by Rep-
resentative Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.), voting 192-231.96 Immediately after
defeating the disapproval resolution, the House passed overwhelmingly a "sense
of the House" 97 resolution affirming the Congress's commitment to hold the
administration to promises it had made concerning the treatment of environmen-
tal safeguards, worker safety, and worker adjustment assistance. 9 s On May 24,
1991, the Senate disapproval resolution sponsored by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
also failed, by a vote of 36-59. 99 Consequently, the President has authority until
June 1, 1993, to enter into trade agreements pursuant to fast track procedures. 1oo
VI. A Prescription for a Pragmatic Partnership
As Senator Gramm characterized it, the rejection of the House and Senate
resolutions that would have disapproved the extension of fast track was a "tri-
umph of reason over passion" and "a victory of public interest over the special
interests." 10 1 Clearly, it was a strong, bipartisan endorsement for using trade
93. Id. at H3544 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
94. Id. at H3608 (comments of Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.)).
95. See, e.g., id. at H3498 (comments of Rep. Anthony C. Beilenson (D-Cal.)), H3572 (com-
ments of Rep. William Hughes (D-N.J.)), H3590 (comments of Rep. Thomas McMillen (D-Md.)),
H3609 (comments of Rep. Bill Barrett (R-Neb.)), S6639 (comments of Sen. Thomas Daschle
(D-S.D.)).
96. Id. at H3588.
97. Id. at H3589, H3610.
98. EXCHANGE OF LETrERS, supra note 47.
99. 137 CONG. REc. S6829 (daily ed. May 24, 1991).
100. Even though the administration prevailed in the vote on an extension disapproval resolution,
the fast track remains decidedly fragile. Despite its inclusion in a statute, it remains expressly subject
to the constitutional rulemaking authority of each house. At any time, either the House of Repre-
sentatives or the Senate can change its fast track rule, or eliminate the fast track altogether. Therefore,
the administration and supporters of the Round and North American free trade talks must remain
vigilant to preserve the fast track.
101. 137 CONG. REc. S6586 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
SPRING 1992
198 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
negotiations to open foreign markets and thus enhance American competitive-
ness. A comfortable majority in both houses basically decided to "give trade a
chance."
102
The debate, however, exposed the fragility of the fast track and the peril for
any trade agreement negotiated by an administration without sufficient involve-
ment of the Congress. For the President to enjoy both credibility with America's
trading partners and substantial prospects for congressional passage of imple-
menting legislation, these two branches must truly work together as partners: in
the establishment of negotiating objectives, throughout the actual negotiations,
and in the implementation of agreements in U.S. domestic law.
Pragmatically, this means that the administration must consult the Congress
not only regularly, but meaningfully. While naturally loathe to disclose publicly
its strategy, tactics, and goals, administration officials must be able and willing
to consult with and confide in members and their staffs on these decisions. Some
disagreements about substance are unavoidable, but Congress should have no just
ground for complaint against the administration regarding procedures.
While regular and meaningful consultation with the Congress may sound easy
to those not directly involved with the federal government, it requires an enor-
mous expenditure of energy and time by many administration officials. The U.S.
Trade Representative is not able to address the combined houses, as the President
does when he delivers his State of the Union message. Even if she had this
opportunity, it is far too public a forum in which to consult meaningfully without
betraying negotiating positions to other nations. Instead, teams of administration
officials, at varying levels and from varying agencies, haunt House and Senate
hearing rooms, chambers, and corridors in an effort faithfully and diligently to
meet their responsibility to consult with the Congress. However inefficient and
diverting this requirement, it must be fulfilled.
For its part, on the other hand, Congress must be prepared to shoulder the
burden of making trade-offs if it wishes to be a responsible partner in trade
negotiations. The classic public injunction of the Congress to any administra-
tion in trade negotiations is to achieve 100 percent of all U.S. objectives and to
make no concessions. While this is an understandable starting point, it is
impossible to realize. Negotiations are based upon compromise. Trade agree-
ments are likely to endure only if they embody compromise, since sovereign
governments adhere over time only to arrangements that, on balance, serve
their interests.
Of course, members of Congress who wish to be reelected cannot reasonably
take positions in public that would provoke opposition by constituents. In public
many in the Congress feel compelled to enjoin the administration to make no
sacrifice and to attain all goals. In private, however, members must be prepared
102. Id. at H3607 (comments of Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.)).
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to prioritize their objectives and to share with the administration their advice
about negotiating positions. Unless they are prepared to do so, they are ethically
estopped from complaining about the trade-offs that the administration ultimately
must make.
Of course, even if both branches are responsible and faithful partners, dis-
agreements on the substance will occur. Even when the administration consults
diligently and the Congress, in private, offers frank advice about negotiating
positions and trade-offs, the administration must sift conflicting advice-from
different members and committees, the private sector, and executive agencies-
and make hard choices that will not be universally popular.
Ultimately, the fast track requires the executive to exercise leadership, but
reserves power for the Congress to accept or reject the agreements concluded
with its advice. This formula does not guarantee that trade negotiations will
succeed, but it provides the best opportunity for such success. If the Congress is
realistic in its private advice to the administration, and the administration in turn
is forthcoming in regular consultations with the Congress, there is no reason why
this fast track partnership, while always fragile, cannot prosper through not only
the Uruguay Round and NAFTA negotiations, but for the trade negotiations of
the twenty-first century as well.
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